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TORTS
I. PHYSICAL INJIMY TO PEON OR PRoPmrr
A. Duty of Care
In Edward's of Byrnes Down8 v. Charleston Sheet HetaZ C'
the plaintiff's cause of action was based on the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant, a subcontractor, in failing to complete
in a timely manner the installation of a roof to a new addition
to plaintiff's store and in failing during the interim period to
cover the openings in the unfinished roof. The complaint al-
leged that the defendant knew, or should have known, that, when
it rained, water would pour through the openings, flood plain-
tiff's adjacent storeroom, and damage the room and any goods
stored there. The trial court, granting a nonsuit, reasoned that
the defendant's liability, if any, was to the primary contractor in
contract, and that the defendant subcontractor owed no duty
to the third-party plaintiff arising from a mere nonfeasance.
2
On appeal, the supreme court found, however, a duty, indepen-
dent of contract, based on the common law duty to exercise due
care in order not to injure or damage others. The court, avoiding
the question of a subcontractor's liability to third parties for a
nonfeasance, found instead an inferable misfeasance in the im-
proper performance of the contract and held that liability "will
attach if the act of omission of a duty owed another . . . is
the direct, proximate and efficient cause of the injury."3 This
case lays a firm foundation in South Carolina for recovery in
tort by an injured third party against a subcontractor who has
breached his contract with the prime contractor.
The duty of care owed by a motorist in South Carolina, to a
child who is under adult supervision was defined in the case of
Tetterton v. Foggie.4 Here, the plaintiff, a minor, was injured
by the defendant's moving automobile when the child jerked
from the hand of his babysitter and darted into the side of the
passing automobile.
1. 253 S.C. 537, 172 S.E.2d 120 (1970).
2. See Spiegler v. School Dist of New Rochelle, 39 Misc. 2d 946, 242
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1963) (holding that a nonfeasance is not tortious as to a third
party beneficiary).
3. Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 186 S.C. 167, 175, 195
S.E. 247, 251 (1938). Accord, Benedict v. Marks Shows, 178 S.C. 169, 182
S.E. 299 (1935).
4. 172 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1970).
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In deciding this case, the court reiterated its position taken in
Herring v. Boyd6 : a motorist is held to a greater duty of
vigilance and caution when in the presence of children than
when in the presence of adults. However,
[w]hen a child, who is under adult restraint, breaks
away from such adult and darts into the path of a
motorist who is observing the rules of the road with
respect to speed, control, and who is maintaining a
proper lookout, the resulting injury . . . is not action-
able.0
The court reasoned that a prudent person could assume that an
accompanying adult would guard against peril to the child and
noted that a motorist is not an insurer of a child's safety. The
court concluded, however, that whether the defendant had met
the proper standard of care would depend on the facts of the
individual case, which implies that the "reasonable prudent man"
still defines the standard of conduct to which motorists will be
held. 7
In Turner '. Sincdair Refining Co.,8 which involved a suit for
personal injuries received by the plaintiff while loading his
gasoline tanker at the defendant's petrol facility, the South
Carolina Supreme Court restated and reaffirmed the nature of
the duty owed by a property owner to a business invitee. The
court held that due care must be exercised to keep the premises
in a reasonably safe condition and, additionally, that a land-
owner must warn such a business invitee "of any latent perils."9
In so holding, the court cited no specific authority and stated
that none was required for this established rule. Noting, how-
ever, that the defendant was not an insurer of the plaintiff's
safety, the court implied that liability for latent defects will lie
only where the defect is known or reasonably discoverable; this
is the majority view and is consonant with prior South Carolina
decisions.10
5. 245 S.C. 284, 140 S.E.2d 246 (1965).
6. Tetterton v. Foggie, 172 S.E.2d 369, 372 (S.C. 1970). See Brown v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 234 Ia. 860, 101 So. 2d 696 (1958).
7. Most jurisdictions demand that a driver exhibit extra caution when in
the presence of children, but also recognize that a driver is not an insurer
against their injury; therefore, having taken proper precautions, a driver
will not be held liable for injuries that he could not have reasonably pre-
vented. See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396(2) (1969).
8. 254 S.C. 36, 173 S.E.2d 356 (1970).
9. Id. at 42, 173 S.E.2d at 359.
10. Bruno v. Pendleton Realty Co., 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580 (1962);
Bolen v. Strange, 192 S.C. 284, 6 S.E.2d 46 (1939). This is the overwhelming
majority opinion. See 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 63(46) (1969).
[Vol. 22
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B. Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk
Turner v. Sinclair Refining Co.11 also involved questions of
plaintiff's contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The
plaintiff was injured while working upon the defendant's
slippery, self-service petrol platform. Considering both ques-
tions as a single issue, the court noted that assumption of a
known risk associated with one's endeavor is not dispositive of
any question of liability unless that risk was the proximate
cause of the injury. Furthermore, the defendant must show that
any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was
characterized by "willfulness" before such contributory negli-
gence will bar the plaintiff's recovery 2 ; simple contributory
negligence is thus no defense. 13 Both the issues of proximate
cause and willfulness were held to be jury questions.
In Varner v. Ballenger Paving Co.14 the court adopted lan-
guage from Trantham v. Gillioz,'5 in ordering a directed verdict
against a plaintiff grievously injured in a collision with a dump
truck parked at dusk along an uncompleted but accessible stretch
of super-highway. Quoting a statement from Trantham con-
cerning travel on a road obviously under construction, the court
said:
Under such conditions the traveler must use and exercise
his faculties to see and discover and to so manage his
automobile that he may, by the exercise of care com-
mensurate with the circumstances, avoid any dangers
and difficulties which he might encounter .... He
must proceed with caution. And the duty to use such
care extends not only to the avoidance of particular
dangers which are known or apparent, but also to the
anticipation and discovery of such obstructions as may
be discovered by the exercise of due care.'
6
In directing the verdict, the court took note of the undisputed
testimony of eyewitnesses that the plaintiff's car was traveling at
11. 254 S.C. 36, 173 S.E.2d 356 (1970).
12. Wilfulness was defined by the court as the "conscious failure to use due
care." Id. at 44, 173 S.E2d at 360.
13. Accord, Dawson v. South Carolina Power Co., 220 S.C. 26, 66 S.E.2d 322
(1951); Marks v. I.M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943).
Simple contributory negligence, which is merely a lack of due care, ceases to
be a defense when the injury complained of is shown to have been done will-
fully and purposely or where it results from such gross negligence as would
imply wantonness or recklessness.
14. 173 S.E.2d 789 (S.C. 1970).
15. 348 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1961).
16. Id. at 741-42.
1970]
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an excessive rate of speed and that other motorists had been able
to identify the obstruction and pass without difficulty. By so
ruling, the court requires that persons who would travel on
uncompleted stretches of road assume the risk of dangers cre-
ated by construction activities.17
C. Burder of Proof: Re& Ipsa Loguitur
In 0T v. Saylor"' the plaintiff was denied recovery for
injuries received when she stepped from her automobile which
defendant's agent had parked over a grease pit in their filling
station, walked to the front of the car, and the. slipped on ac-
cumulated grease and fell into the pit. There were no witnesses
to testify for the plaintiff other than herself; therefore, the
court ordered a directed verdict for the defendants upon a
finding that the plaintiff had failed to support her allegations
of negligence. Missing from the testimony was any evidence of
where the grease had come from, how much was there, how long
it had been there, and whether or not the defendant could have
discovered and removed it through the exercise of due care.
In a vigorous dissent an acting associate justice, pointing to
the evidential hardships faced by plaintiffs in similar situations,
argued the desirability of South Carolina's adopting the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. The majority, taking note of this dissent,
indicated a willingness to re-examine its position regarding
res ipsa loquitur, but only in a "factually appropriate" case
wherein the issue is briefed by counsel.1 9 Though just what con-
stitutes a "factually appropriate" case was not defined, a not
unfavorable attitude on the part of the court toward this rule of
evidence is clear.
17. See also Taylor v. South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't, 242 S.C. 171, 130
S.E.2d 418 (1963), where the court held that there was no inference of any
negligence of the defendant where a motor grader, on the road but in plain
view, was struck by plaintiff. This appears to be in accord with the rule in
most other jurisdictions that only ordinary care is required of drivers in keep-
ing a proper lookout, but that the driver is bound to take notice of potential
dangers if there is something to put him on his guard. See 60 C.J.S. Motor
Vehicles §§ 201(5), 201(7) (1969).
18. 253 S.C. 155, 169 S.E.2d 396 (1969).
19. South Carolina, along with Michigan and Pennsylvania, is in the
undisputed minority in failing to adopt this doctrine by name. See 65A
C.J.S. Negligence § 220.3 (1969). South Carolina's position has, however,
deteriorated in areas involving relationships such as bailments, master-
servant, passenger-carrier, and bank-depositer, where there is privity between
the parties. In these areas, negligence law will recognize a prima facie case
predicated solely upon a presumption or inference. Orr v. Saylor, 253 S.C.
155, 164, 169 S.E2d 396, 400 (1969) (Weatherford, A.A.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 2
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D. Liability of Landlord to Tenant
The non-liability of a landlord to a tenant for bodily injuries
arising out of the landlord's failure properly to make repairs on
the leased premises was illustrated in Sheppard v. Nienow. 20
In Sheppard the plaintiff, a small child, was injured while being
carried by his mother who tripped after dark on a metal stake
located on their rented property in the defendant's trailer park.
The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the defendant
in failing to replace burned out lights in nearby lamp posts
and in failing to remove the stake from the plaintiff's yard,
both acts having been requested.
The court pointed out that there was no legal duty involved
here which would support an action ex delicto. Noting that the
parties could vary their legal relationship so as to impose a duty
to repair, the court reaffirmed the oft-stated South Carolina view
that any such failure to repair under such an agreement would
give rise only to an action ex contractu. In an action ex con-
tractu damages for personal injuries to tenant or family are not
recoverable.2
1
E. Attractive Nuisance
The fact that a dirt clod was not viewed by the court as an
inherently dangerous instrumentality was dispositive of the
issue raised in the case of Kirven v. Askins. 22 This action was
brought to recover for injuries received by the minor plaintiff
when struck in the eye by a dirt clod while he was at a con-
struction site under the control of the defendant. This suit was
founded upon two basic theories: the first was the theory of
attractive nuisance; the second was its sister theory as espoused
in Everett v. White.23 The first theory states that, where the
owner or occupier of grounds brings or artificially creates
something thereon which by its nature is especially attractive to
children and at the same time dangerous to them, he must take
reasonable care to see that the dangerous items are so guarded
that the children will not be injured by them.2 4  Under the
20. 254 S.C. 44, 173 S.E.2d 343 (1970).
21. See Conner v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E2d
385 (1963); Pendarvis v. Wannamaker, 173 S.C. 299, 175 S.E. 531 (1933);
Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 356 (1965).
22. 253 S.C. 110, 169 S.E.2d 139 (1969).
23. 245 S.C. 331, 140 S.E.2d 582 (1965).
24. Additionally, unless the child goes on the property by reason of the
temptation of the very instrumentality which is held to be the attractive
nuisance, he cannot recover. Hancock v. Aiken Mills, Inc., 180 S.C. 93, 185
S.E. 188 (1936).
1970]
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E verett theory, where the dangerous thing may not be, strictly
speaking, inherently attractive to children, yet where it is left
so exposed that children are likely to come in contact with it,
the responsible person is charged with the duty of taking reason-
able pains to prevent injury to them.25 In both instances the
defendant's duty of care arises from maintenance of an in-
herently dangerous instrumentality; a commonplace clod of dirt
was not viewed to be such.
This holding is consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions
which have held that lime putty,26 unslaked lime, 27 a. piece of
shingle,28 and a pile of sand29 are not inherently dangerous.
F. Doctrine of ,Sudden Emergency
In Poulos v. James3" the court recognized that the doctrine of
sudden emergency 3 l may be applicable in cases involving rear-
end automobile collisions. At issue was the question of whether
the sudden stopping of a preceding vehicle, which results in a
rear-end collision, is a normal hazard, or whether it is such an
unexpected event as to make the doctrine available to the rear
motorist. Noting that other courts have applied the doctrine
in rear-end collision cases, 32 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that, absent anything which would put one on notice
otherwise, a driver is entitled to presume that vehicles being
driven to the front will be operated in accordance with traffic
laws and with due care. Consequently, the court held that a
charge as to the doctrine of sudden emergency was proper and
that the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the rear
driver such as would make the doctrine inapplicable was prop-
erly submitted to the jury.33
25. See Lynch v. Motel Enterprises, Inc., 248 S.C. 490, 151 S.E.2d 435
(1966).
26. Camp v. Peel, 33 Cal. App. 2d 612, 92 P2d 428 (1939).
27. Latta v. Brooks, 293 Ky. 346, 169 S.W.2d 7 (1943).
28. Massino v. Smaglick, 3 Wis. 2d 607, 89 N.W.2d 223 (1958).
29. Landman v. M. Susan & Associates, Inc., 63 Ill. App. 2d 292, 211 N.E2d
107 (1965).
30. 174 S.E.2d 152 (S.C. 1970).
31. See W. PRoSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33 (3d ed. 1964):
"[A]n actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held to the
standard of conduct normally applied to one who is in no such situation."
32. See Harris v. Clark, 251 Iowa 807, 103 N.W.2d 215 (1960); Hill v.
Hill, 168 Kan. 639, 215 P.2d 159 (1950) ; Jaeger v. Estep, 2351 Ore. 212, 384
P.2d 175 (1963); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2D 76 (1961).
33. The doctrine is not available if the emergency has resulted from the
negligent acts of the party seeking to invoke it. For an analysis of the
doctrine of sudden emergency in South Carolina, see Wise, The Sudden
Emergency Doctrine As Applied In South Carolina, 20 S.C.L. REv. 408 (1968).
[Vol. 22
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G. Guest Statute
The South Carolina Guest Statute3 4 denies any cause of
action for injury to a passenger riding without payment against
an owner or operator of a motor vehicle, unless the injury results
from an accident which was "intentional" or was caused by the
owner's or the operator's "heedlessness" or by his "reckless dis-
regard for the rights of others."3 5 In Dearyburj v. Albert,36
brought under this statute, the plaintiff and the defendant were
both minors, sixteen years of age. The South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed a jury verdict for the defendant on the grounds
that the trial judge's charge, to the effect that a guest can only
hold the driver to such a, standard of care as the driver's
experience and driving proficiency allow, was erroneous. The
court held that the proper measurement of tortious conduct in
such a case is that standard based on the actions of "a person of
ordinary reason or prudence" T3 7 acting under similar circum-
stances. The court said that this was true whether the question
was one of simple negligence or one of recklessness under the
guest statute.38  This decision, which is directly contrary to the
position taken in most jurisdictions regarding the standard of
care to which a guest is entitled,3 9 significantly eases the plain-
tiff's burden of proof in cases involving an allegedly unskilled
driver.
H. Assault and Battery
In May v. Gentry4" the court held that, in a case dealing with
alleged assault and battery, to which reasonable force used in
ejecting a trespasser is a recognized defense, it is not necessary
to charge that a trespasser must be given an opportunity to de-
part,41 since this fact is implicit in the use of "reasonable
34. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
35. Id. "Intentional" means causing the act purposely, willfully or designedly;
"heedless" means careless; and "reckless disregard of the rights of others"
means wanton misconduct evincing a reckless indifference of consequences to
the life, limb, health, reputation, or property rights of another. Fulghum v.
Bleakley, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30 (1935).
36. 253 S.C. 263, 170 S.E.2d 15 (1969).
37. Suber v. Smith, 243 S.C. 458, 134 S.E.2d 404 (1964).
38. Jones v. Dague, 252 S.C. 261, 166 S.E.2d 99 (1969).
39. See 8 Am. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 501 (1963); 43
A.L.R.2D 1155 (1955); 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 402 (1969). Most courts
hold in accord with the trial judge's charge that a guest can only hold the
driver to such a standard of care as the driver's experience and driving
proficiency allow.
40. 174 S.E.2d 764 (S.C. 1970).
41. Accord, State v. Petit, 144 S.C. 452, 142 S.E. 725 (1928).
1970] ,
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force.12 This standard of temperance demanded of a landowner
is born of common sense; consequently, this decision merely
further identifies the "reasonable man."
II. INDiGNmTs AGAINST THE PRSON
A. Abuse of Process
Bell Lines, Inc. v. Strickland involved an action brought for
freight charges allegedly due on a shipment of tires. The de-
fendant counterclaimed alleging, inter alia, "abuse of process"
in that prior to the commencement of the action the plaintiff
had maliciously harassed the defendant in order to collect a
non-existent debt and had otherwise injured the defendant's
credit. The court, sustaining the plaintiff's demurrer to the
counterclaim, held that mere commencement of a civil action for
the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction of the defendant does not
constitute the tort of abuse of process which is the "malicious
misuse or perversion of [legal] process for an end not lawfully
warranted by it." 44 Such definition of abuse of process is in
accord with the scope of this tort in South Carolina and else-
where.
45
B. Invasion of Privaoy
In Gantt v. Universal CJ.T. Credit Corporation4 6 the plaintiff
charged that defendant's agents had invaded her right of privacy
by actions allegedly designed to embarrass, humiliate, and
otherwise harass the plaintiff into compelling her husband to
make mortgage payments owed solely by the husband to the
defendant. The defendant, demurring, claimed that mere oral
declarations do not support the action and that the communica-
tions complained of were of a purely private nature for the per-
mitted purpose of collection of a debt by a creditor; the trial
court overruled the demurrer.
On appeal from this ruling the supreme court acknowledged
that the tort of invasion of privacy exists in South Carolina,
47
42. See State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955), as to use of
reasonable force; see State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 120 S.E. 248 (1923), for
a summary of the rights of a landowner to eject a trespasser.
43. 173 S.E.2d 788 (S.C. 1970).
44. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 209, 153 S.E.2d
693, 695 (1967).
45. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRs 876 (3d ed. 1964).
The "malice" required, except as to punitive damages, is not spite or ill will,
but rather the improper purpose itself for which the process is used.
46. 173 S.E2d 658 (S.C. 1970).
47. See Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956);
Holloman v. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
[Vol. 22-
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but noted that the issues of whether an oral declaration will
support the action48 and to what extent a creditor can pursue the
wife of a debtor are still open questions of significance in South
Carolina. Consequently, the court refused to decide these ques-
tions on the pleadings and affirmed.
It should be noted, however, that the Ohio courts have found
such vicious and intentional harassment by a collection agency,
as here alleged, to be an invasion of privacy. 49 The Ohio court
stated:
An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the
unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's per-
sonality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with
which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such
a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame
or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."0
If the allegations in Gantt are true, a similar finding by the
South Carolina Supreme Court of an actionable invasion of
privacy would seem to be in the best interest of the public.
III. COMMRCIAL WRONGS
A. Conversion
In Long ,v. Gibbs Auto Wrecking Co., 5 ' the plaintiffs brought
an action for conversion of their automobile. Testimony showed
that the automobile had been involved in an accident and was
subsequently bailed to one Boatwright, a wrecker operator, who
stored it on his lot. Shortly thereafter, an agent of Gibbs,
negligently mistaking the plaintiffs' automobile for one re-
cently purchased from Boatwright by Gibbs, carried the plain-
tiffs' car away. Upon discovering the error, Boatwright
immediately notified Gibbs and made repeated attempts to
have the automobile returned. But, despite these efforts and
with full knowledge that the vehicle belonged to the plaintiffs,
Gibbs sold it to a third party and refused to account to the
plaintiffs for its value. The court held that these actions con-
stituted a conversion and affirmed the award of both actual
48. Among those jurisdictions which have decided this point, there is a
split of authority. See 19 A.L.R.3D 1318 (1968); W. PRoSSER, HANDBOOX OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 (3d ed. 1964).
49. See Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E2d 340 (1956).
50. Id. at 35, 133 N.E.2d at 341.
51. 253 S.C. 370, 171 S.E2d 155 (1969).
9
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damages (the car's value at time of conversion) and punitive
damages.5
2
B. Fraud and Deceit
In Daniels v. Coleman"' the plaintiff, alleging that the de-
fendant had obtained a mortgage and note from him fraudu-
lently, brought this action based on fraud and deceit. The only
actual damages testified to were due to travel expenses and phone
calls stemming from the incident. In reversing the trial court,
the supreme court decided that it was error to instruct that
damage is inherent in a promissory note which has been delivered
because of fraud. While noting that there is authority for this
proposition when fraud is pled as an affirmative defense,54 the
court held that, when the plaintiff asserts fraud and deceit, he
must establish proof of violation of a legal right and actual
damage and the two elements must concur. 5 Nor do travel
expenses, phone calls, and other general inconveniences asso-
ciated with protection of one's legal interests constitute the
"actual damage" necessary to support the cause of action.58 This
holding restates the South Carolina position as to damages and
represents the majority rule that the time and attentions inevit-
ably required to protect one's rights are generally not actionable
as damages (although they may be where earnings are lost). 57
C. Trespass
An additional issue in the case of Daniels v. Coleman involved
an alleged trespass guare clausum fregit. Testimony showed that
the plaintiff had obtained title to a farm, subject to a life estate
in a house thereon held by the plaintiff's father. In ruling that
the plaintiff could not maintain an action for trespass upon
this residence, the court noted that, in order to establish an
injury to one's possessory right in realty, one must first be in
possession, either actually or constructively. 58 Consequently,
52. Accord, Powell v. A.K. Brown Motor Co., 200 S.C. 75, 20 S.E2d 636
(1942), and Neel v. Clark, 193 S.C. 412, 8 S.E2d 740 (1940), as to the
elements of this tort.
53. 253 S.C. 218, 169 S.E.2d 593 (1969).
54. 91 A.L.R.2o 354 (1963).
55. Davis v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 194, 153 S.E.2d 399 (1967);
Rice v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 196 S.C. 410, 13 S.E.2d 493 (1940).
56. See Rimer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d
742 (1966) ; Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc. 240 S.C. 26, 124 S.E.2d 585 (1962).
57. 37 C.J.S. Fraud §§ 40, 41, 141(2) (1943).
58. Constructive possession is recognized to be in a person holding legal title
to real property which is unoccupied or occupied only by an agent or
representative of said legal owner. See Lane v. Mims, 221 S.C. 236, 70 S.E2d
244 (1952) ; 52 Am. Jur. Trespass § 27 (1944).
[Vol. 22
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since constructive possession is displaced by the actual posses-
sion"s of a party holding a freehold, the plaintiff had no pos-
sessory right to be violated, such right lying only in the father.
This case thus represents a logical expansion of earlier holdings
to the effect that a landlord cannot maintain an action for
trespass to leased premises possessed by a tenant 0 and is con-
sistent with the proposition that, since trespass interferes with
possession, there must first be possession. 1
JoHn B. GRIBALL
59. Littleton v. Roberts, 181 S.C. 303, 187 S.E. 349 (1936).
60. Dial v. Gardner, 104 S.C. 456, 89 S.E. 396 (1916).
61. Macedonia Baptist Church v. City of Columbia, 195 S.C. 59, 10 S.E.2d
350 (1940).
1970]
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